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How F.E.L.A. Became Liability Without Fault
Gaspare A. Corso*
In 1889 President Harrison said,
It is a reproach to our civilization that any class of American
Workmen should, in pursuit of a necessary and useful voca-
tion, be subject to a peril of life and limb as great as a sol-
dier in time of war.'
Those were indeed the days of social injustice and exploita-
tion of the laboring class. And we were then, as now, a people
given to the melodramatic, hearts-and-flowers approach.
In 1906 Congress enacted a Federal Employers' Liability
Act, [34 Stat. 232 (1906)], covering all employees of common
carriers by railroad when the carrier was engaged in interstate
or foreign commerce. This act was held unconstitutional. 2 But a
second act, passed in 1908 [45 U.S.C.A. See. 51-60], was limited
to employees who were themselves in interstate or foreign com-
merce. This act is now in effect.3
The Federal Employers' Liability Act supersedes the com-
mon and statutory law of the states ("There is no federal com-
mon law"),4 and this is true regardless of where the action is
brought.5 Under common law, the injured employee was faced
with the burden of proof and obliged to overcome the defenses
of contributory negligence, assumption of risk and the fellow-
servant rule.6 But it is apparent that Congress was dissatisfied
with the common law approach to the master-servant relation-
* B.A., Western Reserve Univ.; Employee of Ohio Valley Ins. Co.; Third-
year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School of Baldwin-Wallace Col-
lege.
1 Hare, Actions for Personal Injuries and Death of Railroad Workers, 17
Ala. L. R. 201 (1965), citing 12 Messages and Papers of the Presidents 5486.
2 The Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463, 28 S. Ct. 141, 52 L. Ed. 297
(1908).
3 Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1, 32 S. Ct. 169, 56 L. Ed. 327,
38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 44 (1912).
4 Schopp v. Muller Dairies, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 50 (E. D. N. Y., 1938).
5 Rowlands v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 149 Wis. 51, 135 N. W. 156 (1912).
6 Prosser, Law of Torts, 549 (3rd Edit., 1964).
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ship.7 The practical effect (at the very least) of the F.E.L.A. is
to abolish many of the defenses available at common law to an
employer when faced by a suit by an employee for injuries
received in the course and scope of his employment.8
Assumption of risk as a defense against employee suits,
however, was for many years held valid under the acts except
in cases where the employer had violated statutes specifically
enacted for employee safety, despite long and often bitter crit-
icism.9 However, at the first session of the 76th Congress in
1939, Congress specifically amended the act to eliminate the em-
ployer's defense of assumption of risk.10
While a person might sympathize with such statements as
that of President Harrison in 1889, the following statement, by
Francis H. Hare, printed in 1965, is enough to give one pause:
The results of the Act can be read in the statistics. In 1907
there were 4,534 railroad men killed and 87,644 injured in
railroad work. In 1950, with more men and railroad work,
there were 392 killed and 22,000 injured."
This is as good an example of statistical syllogistic absurdity as
one is apt to find. Mr. Hare goes on to describe the "Decade of
Progress" as a period beginning in 1957,12 during which the
Supreme Court has decided that sociology takes precedence over
law.
The 1939 Amendment to the F.E.L.A. settled the question of
assumption of risk under the act.1 3 As a result of this amend-
ment, an employee will not be precluded from recovery by his
departure from ordinary and customary practice in performing
his duties. Nor will he be precluded from recovery even where
he chooses, of his own volition, to perform his duties in an un-
necessarily dangerous manner.' 4
Contributory negligence is abolished as a defense under the
7 Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 352 U. S. 500, 77 S. Ct. 443, 1 L. Ed. 2d 493
(1957).
8 Elliott v. Payne, 293 Mo. 581, 239 S. W. 851 (1922).
9 Prosser, op. cit. supra note 6, at 550-551.
10 53 Stat. 1404 (1939).
11 Hare, op. cit. supra note 1, at 204.
12 Id. at 209.
'3 45 U. S. C. A. § 51 (1908).
14 Thomson v. Boles, 123 F. 2d 487 (8th Cir., 1941), cert. den. 315 U. S. 804,
62 S. Ct. 632, 86 L. Ed. 1204 (1942).
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act,15 even where the employee's conduct would constitute a
criminal offense in the state of the occurrence. 16 The act does,
however, by its terms, provide for the diminution of damages
in proportion to the employee's negligence.17
Under F.E.L.A., as under common law, the employer has the
duty of reasonable care in providing a safe place to work for his
employees. In Payne v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co.,I s where a
brakeman was killed as a result of a derailment caused by a
large accumulation of ashes on a private spur track, the court
was emphatic in declaring the duty of the railroad to be non-
delegable, regardless of ownership or control of the property.
The court further stated that if the employer should attempt to
delegate its duty to an agent, it could not avoid its liability. Of
course the court used the word "agent" to color its compliance
with the provisions of the act, but failed to observe that no agency
existed in the instant case. 19
Recently, a case involving alleged failure to furnish a reason-
ably safe place to work arose, where a shop machinist slipped
and fell in the process of hopping off a locomotive platform onto
a shop platform 35 inches away. The Court of Appeals ruled the
evidence insufficient to submit the case to a jury. Petition for
certiorari was denied.
2 0
Also abolished under F.E.L.A. is the defense of the fellow-
servant doctrine. 2' The effect of this abrogation of the common
15 LaMere v. Railway Transfer Co., 125 Minn. 159, 145 N. W. 1068 (1914).
Fort Street Union Depot Co. v. Hillen, 119 F. 2d 307 (6th Cir., 1941), cert.
denied, 314 U. S. 642, 62 S. Ct. 82, 86 L. Ed. 515 (1941).
16 Spokane & I. E. R. Co. v. Campbell, 241 U. S. 497, 36 S. Ct., 683, 60 L. Ed.
1125 (1916).
17 45 U. S. C. A. §53 (1908);
Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Jones Administratrix, 241 U. S. 181, 36
S. Ct. 513, 60 L. Ed. 943 (1916).
Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Earnest, 229 U. S. 114, 33 S. Ct. 654, 57 L.
Ed. 1096 (1913).
Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co., 291 U. S. 205, 54 S. Ct. 402, 78
L. Ed. 763 (1934).
St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Floyd, 146 Okla. 42, 293 P. 250, 77
A. L. R. 1431 (1930).
Cross v. Spokane P. & S. Ry. Co., 158 Wash. 428, 291 P. 336 (1930).
Ames v. Western Pac. R. Co., 48 Nev. 78, 227 P. 1009 (1924).
18 309 F. 2d 546 (6th Cir., 1962), cert. den. 374 U. S. 827, 83 S. Ct. 936,
9 L. Ed. 2d 968 (1963).
19 Ibid.
20 Ambold v. Seaboard Air Line R. R. Co., 34 U. S. L. Week 3063 (4th Cir.
1965), cert. denied 34 U. S. L. Week 3119 (Oct. 11, 1965).
21 Taylor v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 292 Ill. App. 457, 11 N. E. 2d 610
(1937).
(Continued on next page)
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law is to make the negligence of a fellow employee that of the
employer.2 2 While the employer will not generally be found
negligent where the fellow employee is acting outside the scope
of his employment, 23 he will be held liable if the employee com-
mits an assault in the scope of his employment while acting in his
employer's interest.2 4 Where employee A complained of work
going too slowly and employee B placed his hands on A's shoul-
ders in an attempt to placate him and A struck B violently,
merely to gratify his own temper, the railroad was found not
liable as A was wholly outside the scope of his employment.25
In the case at hand, the fellow employee was known to have a
volatile temper and the parties orally stipulated the action be
tried to the court without a jury.
However, a railroad can be liable for negligence in the em-
ployment or retention of an employee whose dangerous pro-
pensities are known. In so finding, the court in Najera v. South-
ern Pacific Company,26 reviewed Davis v. Green,27 which it con-
strued as holding only that while a railroad was not liable for
the intentional torts of its employees, it may still be liable for its
own negligence. In a recent case, the appellate court upheld a
judgment N.O.V. on the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove
the railroad negligent in employing and retaining the employee
who assaulted him. The United States Supreme Court reversed
the decision of the state court, however, finding sufficient evidence
was available.28
(Continued from preceding page)
Eley v. Chicago Great Western R. Co., 186 Iowa 312, 166 N. W. 739
(1918).
Merrick v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co., 141 Kan. 591, 42 P. 2d 950
(1935).
Minneapolis &c. R. Co. v. Rock, 279 U. S. 410, 49 S. Ct. 363, 73 L. Ed. 766
(1929).
22 Tash v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 335 Mo. 1148, 76 S. W. 2d 690
(1934).
23 Davis & Green, 260 U. S. 349, 43 S. Ct. 123, 67 L. E. 299 (1922); In Re
Southern Pac. Co., 30 F. 2d 723, 1928 A. M. C. 901 (S. D. N. Y. 1928).
24 Ochsrider v. Reading Company, 172 F. Supp. 830 (E. D. Pa. 1959).
25 Ibid.
26 191 Cal. App. 2d 634, 13 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1961).
27 Davis, supra note 23.
28 Harrison v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, 35 Ill. App. 2d 66, 181
N. E. 2d 737 (1962), reversed 372 U. S. 248, 83 S. Ct. 690, 9 L. Ed. 2d 711
(1963).
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While earlier cases dealt extensively with proximate cau-
sation from a common law standpoint,2 9 later cases evidenced a
departure from the historic tests of proximate causation. In
Rogers v. Missouri Pacfic R. Co., where an employee fell from
a culvert while attempting to avoid flames from burning weeds
which were fanned by a passing train, the lower court held that
the plaintiff's injury was due to an "emergency brought about
by himself." In reversing the lower court, the Supreme Court
said,
Under this statute the test of a jury case is simply whether
the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer
negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing
the injury or death for which damages are sought. (Empha-
sis added) 3
Any uncertainty as to the future of proximate cause under
the act was put to rest by the court in Page v. St. Louis South-
western Railway Co. where the plaintiff employee was knocked
from a ladder when an overhead door he was repairing kicked
backwards, knocking him from the ladder; the court found prox-
imate-cause instructions, requiring that the jury find that the
accident was the "natural and probable consequence" of defend-
ant's acts, were prejudicially erroneous. 3 1
Res Ipsa Loquitur
Res ipsa loquitur is, simply stated, circumstantial evidence,32
and creates an "inference of negligence, '3 3 evidence to be weighed
by a jury.34
The progression and expansion of res ipsa loquitur in its ap-
plication under the F.E.L.A. can be clearly followed: e.g., Where
an individual was found dead of skull fracture alongside tracks
and a locomotive had just passed and lumps of coal were found
29 Spokane & Inland Empire Railroad Company v. Campbell, supra note 16;
New York Central Railroad Co. v. Ambrose, Administratrix, 280 U. S.
486, 50 S. Ct. 198, 74 L. Ed. 562 (1930);
Penna. R. Co. v. Chamberlain, 288 U. S. 333, 53 S. Ct. 391, 77 L. Ed. 819
(1933).
30 Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 352 U. S. 500, 77 S. Ct. 443, 1 L.
Ed. 2d 493 (1957).
31 312 F. 2d 84 (5th Cir., 1963).
32 Prosser, Law of Torts, 217 (3rd Ed., 1964).
33 Ibid.; Jesionowski v. Boston & Maine R. Co., 329 U. S. 452, 67 S. Ct. 401,
91 L. Ed. 416 (1947).
34 Ibid., Jesionowski.
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lying near his head; 35 where a railroad employee was electro-
cuted in a cab from an undetermined cause; 36 where an employee
was crushed when a crane he was operating fell over on its side;
3 7
where an injury stemmed from a bolt breaking, as a result of
which a heavy object fell against the plaintiff-employee, with no
evidence that the bolt was defective or that the defendant should
have known of the defect;38 and where a defective jack slipped,
injuring its operator.3 9 In the Supreme Court's first specific
declaration making the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applicable
to F.E.L.A. cases the court said,
A conceptualistic interpretation of Res Ipsa Loquitur has
never been used by this court to reduce the jury's power
to draw inferences from the facts. Such an interpretation
unduly narrows the doctrine as this court has applied it.4"
The "shining hour" of res ipsa loquitur came in 1963. A
passenger train conductor was injured when in the pursuit of
his duties he tried to close a coach door which stuck because
of a defective mechanism. No evidence was offered as to how
the defect came into being. The trial judge set aside the jury's
verdict because the evidence failed to establish even the infer-
ence of knowledge on the part of the defendant. The Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld the verdict on the basis of res ipsa
loquitur, notwithstanding the absence of any affirmative plead-
ing thereto on the part of plaintiff.4
1
Negligence
The words,
• . . resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of . . .
or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its neg-
ligence, ... 42
would seem to preclude any misunderstanding as to the require-
ment intended by Congress that liability under F.E.L.A. be based
35 Lukon v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 131 F. 2d 327 (3rd Cir. 1942).
36 Sweeting v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 142 F. 2d 611 (3rd Cir. 1944).
37 Taylor v. Reading Co., 83 F. Supp. 804 (E. D. Penn. 1949).
38 O'Neill v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 348 U. S. 956, 75 S. Ct. 447, 99
L. Ed. 747 (1955).
39 Wiles v. New York, Chicago and St. Louis Railroad Company, 283 F. 2d
328 (3rd Cir. 1960).
40 Jesionowski v. Boston & Maine R. Co., supra note 33.
41 Fassbinder v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 322 F. 2d 859 (3rd Cir.
1963).
42 45 U. S. C. A. § 51 (1908).
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upon negligence, 43 and that the F.E.L.A. is not intended to be
workmen's compensation. 44 However, where the act complained
of involves a violation of the Safety Appliance Acts, 45 no evidence
of negligence is required and any such violation of the S.A.A.
will be considered negligence per se.4 , Thus, F.E.L.A. and S.A.A.
are regarded as being in pari materia, the former providing the
remedy, the latter the basis for the action.
47
It appears from the foregoing and has indeed been protested
that, of itself, F.E.L.A. does not create liability without fault.
48
Nor may a railroad be considered an insurer of its employee's
safety.49 Negligence must rest upon failure of an employer to
observe some duty or standard of care owing to the employee. 50
And what Congress intended by the use of the word negligence
in the F.E.L.A. would seem something other than that contem-
plated by the Supreme Court today. Not found in court discus-
sions involving railroad litigation are the historic tests of the
ordinary, reasonable, prudent man. Rather we find a very "lib-
eral" construction.51 For, after all, the nature of F.E.L.A. is reme-
dial, though in derogation of common law.52 It creates liability
where there was none at common law.53 Thus, in cases involving
F.E.L.A., the degree of care is discussed from the standpoint of
that demanded by the particular situation,54 commensurate with
43 Inman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 361 U. S. 138, 80 S. Ct. 242, 4 L. Ed.
2d 198 (1959).
Simpson v. Texas & New Orleans Railroad Company, 297 F. 2d 660 (5th
Cir., 1962).
44 Page v. St. Louis Southwestern Railway Co., supra note 31.
45 45 U. S. C. A. § 1-10 (1893-1906).
46 McAllister v. St. Louis Merchants' Bridge Terminal Ry. Co., 324 Mo. 1005,
25 S. W. 2d 791 (1930).
47 Lewis, F. E. L. A., 14 S. C. L. Q. 447 (1962).
48 Seaboard Airline R. Co. v. Stoddard, 82 Ga. App. 743, 62 S. E. 2d, 620
(1950).
49 Southern Ry. Co. v. Bradshaw, 73 Ga. App. 438, 37 S. E. 2d 150 (1946).
50 Holland House Co. v. Baird, 169 N. Y. 136, 62 N. E. 149 (1901).
51 35 Am. Jur., Master and Servant, § 398 (1941).
Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U. S. 635, 50 S. Ct. 440, 74 L. Ed. 1082
(1930).
52 35 Am. Jur., Master and Servant, § 398 (1941).
53 Elliott v. Payne, 293 Mo. 581, 239 S. W. 851, 23 A. L. R. 706 (1922).
54 N. Y. C. R. R. Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357, 21 L. Ed. 627 (1873).
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the danger at hand,5 5 and the danger inherent in the employer's
particular business.5 6
. . . . ordinary care under some circumstances may, para-
doxically as it may seem, be extraordinary care.57
Having hurdled most of the obstacles presented by the com-
mon law defenses to negligence, and having stretched the inter-
pretation of the word negligence to a point where mere existence
as a corporate entity could itself be construed as a first cousin
of negligence, there remained only the final obstacle of in some
way connecting the scienter of negligence with the injury sus-
tained. Should this be accomplished, the F.E.L.A. would in effect
become a quasi-workmen's compensation act.
In 1957, the court, in Rogers v. Missouri etc.58 examining sec-
tion 51 of the F.E.L.A., placed new emphasis on the words "due
in whole or in part to its negligence" in basing the test of a jury
case on the bare inquiry as to whether the reasonable inference
might be drawn that employer negligence played any part in the
injury complained of. The reasoning process of this declaration
followed through in the same year in Webb v. Illinois Central
R.R. Co.,59 and Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines,60 and was
followed by Moore v. Terminal R.R. Assn.,61 Inman v. Baltimore
& Ohio R.R. Co.,62 Harris v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,63 and then
in DeLima v. Trinidad Corporation in 1962 was emphatically
reaffirmed.64
By 1963 the seasoning process was complete and the Supreme
Court was ready to pronounce in Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio
55 Leach v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 48 F. 2d 722 (6th Cir., 1931).
O'Brien v. New York Rys. Co., 185 App. Div. 867, 174 N. Y. S. 116
(1919).
56 Payne v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, 21 Ohio Op. 2d 228, 309
F. 2d 546 (6th Cir., 1962); cert. den. 374 U. S. 827, 83 S. Ct. 936, 9 L. Ed. 2d
968 (1963).
57 Jacobs, Law of Accidents, 17 & 18 (1937) citing: Stonebreaker v. Bam-
berger, a Utah case.
58 Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 352 U. S. 500, 77 S. Ct. 443, 1 L.
Ed. 2d 493 (1957).
59 352 U. S. 512, 77 S. Ct. 451, 1 L. Ed. 2d 503 (1957).
60 352 U. S. 521, 77 S. Ct. 457, 1 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1957).
61 358 U. S. 31, 79 S. Ct. 2, 3 L. Ed. 2d 24 (1958).
62 Supra note 43.
63 361 U. S. 15, 80 S. Ct. 22, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1959).
64 302 F. 2d 585 (2d Cir., 1962).
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R.R. Co.,65 that, in effect, practically no negligence need be
proven in F.E.L.A. cases. After gallantly pledging their allegiance
to the historic requirement of reasonable foreseeability, the court
not only appears to have ignored it but actually chastises the
Appellate Court for asking for definite evidence. The court found
the requirement of foreseeability satisfied when in answer to
specifically propounded interrogatories the jury found that: the
plaintiff had been bitten by a bug, the bug bite caused his con-
dition, the defendant's stagnant pool had attracted the bug, and
defendant knew of the stagnant condition. However, when specifi-
cally asked if they found any reason for the defendant to an-
ticipate mishap or injury, the jury clearly and unambiguously
responded negatively. When asked if they found the related
events within the "realm of reasonability or foreseeability", again
the jury answered in the negative. Notwithstanding technical
objections to the interrogatories as to form, the jury seems to
have been quite emphatic in its finding. The action of the Su-
preme Court in applying "consistent interpretation" hardly seems
justified by the facts.
In a recent case involving conflicting testimony as to whether
an injured employee had backed a forklift truck into an elevator
shaft or had been injured when the unattended truck rolled for-
ward, knocking him into the shaft and then falling on top of him,
the jury found for the plaintiff. However, the Maryland Appel-
late Court reversed on the ground that the jury's verdict was
based on conjecture. On certiorari the Supreme Court reversed,
and in a decision that was by this date a foregone conclusion,
held that the Maryland Appellate Court had improperly invaded
the function of the jury in an F.E.L.A. case.66
In 1934 F.E.L.A. was criticised as having become self-defeat-
ing in its purpose.67 Again, in 1941 it was said to have become
of little benefit to the railway employee. 68 That such criticism
was valid at the time is questionable; it would hardly be valid
today. The employer today stands stripped of the last vestige
65 372 U. S. 108, 83 S. Ct. 659, 9 L. Ed. 2d 618 (1963).
66 Davis v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 379 U. S. 671, 85 S. Ct. 636, 13 L.
Ed. 2d 594 (1965).
67 Schoene & Watson, Workmen's Compensation on Interstate Railways, 47
Harv. L. Rev., 389-424 (1934).
68 Prosser, Law of Torts, 561 (3rd Ed. 1964) citing: Dodd, Administration
of Workmen's Compensation, 773-780 (1936).
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of common law defenses. 69 The court today inquires only into
the question of some color of negligence on the part of the em-
ployer which may have been involved in the most infinitesimal
degree in the employee's injury. Such a conclusion might, at
first blush, appear reckless and prejudiced, that is, if one has
not reviewed such cases as McMillan v. Western Pacific R.R.
Co. 70 This was an action by a train dispatcher, charging the
railroad with negligence in requiring him to assume unusual re-
sponsibility, which resulted in his nervous collapse. Though the
Supreme Court sustained the defendant's demurrer, the Supreme
Court ruled the complaint sufficient to state a cause of action
under F.E.L.A.
It is no defense for the railroad to show that the injury was
brought about by the independent acts of another through no fault
of the railroad. 71 Recovery may be predicated upon "hindsight"
by showing that the employer could have found a safer way for
the employee to do the job in question.72 Foreseeability is dead
under the Act. Its funeral was conducted by the Supreme Court
when it stated,
It is widely held that for a defendant to be liable for con-
sequential damages he need not foresee the particular con-
sequences of his negligent acts; assuming the existence of a
threshold tort against the person, then whatever damages
flow from it are recoverable. 73
Once having taken such latitude in the application of "threshold
tort", it is an open track henceforth. Even false arrest has become
"negligence" within the meaning of F.E.L.A.7 4
Even granting that the "practical problem" of presenting a
negligence case does remain,7 5 the railroad employee today is
better off than his contemporaries in other industries. The rem-
69 Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., supra note 58.
70 54 Cal. 2d 841, 9 Cal. Rptr. 361, 357 P. 2d 449 (1960).
71 Payne v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, supra note 56.
72 Lewis, Federal Employers Liability Act, 14 S. C. L. Q. 447 (1962) citing
L. P. D. No. 1-35 (1-63) Sec. 4502.
73 Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., supra note 65.
74 Slaughter v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, 112 U. S. App. D. C.
327, 302 F. 2d 912 (1962), cert. denied 371 U. S. 827, 83 S. Ct. 48, 9 L. Ed. 2d
65 (1962).
75 Hare, Actions for Personal Injury and Death of Railroad Workers, 17
Ala. L. R. 213 (1965).
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edy under workmen's compensation is in effect a compromise
by which a limited compensation is accepted in exchange for
the assurance that a claim will be paid.76 The railroad employee,
however, has almost the same assurance, but along with it is
the opportunity to "go for broke" in the courts.
Not even the "unavoidable accident" has escaped emascula-
tion by the courts under F.E.L.A. Recall the statement of plain-
tiff in Page v. St. Louis, 17 days after the accident ". . . it was
just an accident, [sic.] just one of those things . . ." 77 Note the
dissent of Judge O'Sullivan in Payne v. Baltimore, "the instruc-
tion . . . has the effect of holding the defendant liable without
fault." 78
As long as there is evidence which, if believed by the jury,
would support a finding of negligence, the jury will be allowed
to make its own justice unfettered by such considerations as
weight of evidence or findings consistent with fact. The trial
court is not privileged to invade the province of the jury.79
Conclusion
Granting that law is "fashioned to the demands of society," 8o
to whom are we to look for such design? Some say that the basis
of the court's authority rests upon the public's faith in its "ob-
jectivity and detachment." 8I Some men, as eminent as Holmes,
base the authority on public expediency:
The very considerations which judges most rarely mention,
and always with an apology, are the secret root from which
the law draws all the juices of life. I mean of course, con-
siderations of what is expedient for the community con-
cerned.8 2
Whether or not one agrees with Justice Harlan that, regard-
ing F.E.L.A.:
76 Prosser, Law of Torts, 543 (1st Edit. 1941).
77 Page v. St. Louis Southwestern Railway Co., 312 F. 2d 84 (5th Cir., 1963).
78 Payne v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, supra note 56.
79 But see Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., supra note 65; Davis v.
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., supra note 66.
80 Mesberg v. City of Duluth, 191 Minn. 425, 254 N. W. 597 (1934).
81 Kurland, The Supreme Court and its Judicial Critics, 6 Utah L. Rev. 457-
466 (1959).
82 Holmes, The Common Law, 35 (1881).
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... It affords a particularly dramatic example of the in-
adequacy of ordinary negligence law to meet the social
obligations of modern industrial society s3
nevertheless one must not omit his further observation that:
The cure for that, however, lies with the legislature and not
with the courts.8
4
83 Gallick case, supra note 65.
84 Ibid.
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